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1 Introduction 
After over a decade of bitter political controversy over welfare state reforms, 
active ageing policies promise battle-weary European social policy-makers 
much-needed respite. As demographic ageing threatens to unravel European 
social protection systems and labour markets in the not too-distant future, 
policy-makers across Europe have found themselves embroiled in divisive and 
bitter policy conflicts over welfare state reforms. Projected increases in old age 
dependency ratios with their implicit health care and pension system price tags 
have prompted a flurry of reform efforts across Europe. As a rule, European 
policy-makers have focused on bringing social protection systems into line with 
projected increases in demand for pensions and health care. Invariably, this has 
meant retrenching pension and health care systems. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
reform experiences of the past years have not been particularly happy. 
Active ageing policies promise to put an end to all of that. Rather than merely 
treating the symptoms in form of higher social expenditure, advocates of active 
ageing policies suggest targeting the root causes of poor health, inactivity and 
dependence in old age. Rather than forcing decision-makers to choose between 
painful and equally unattractive reforms, active ageing promises ‘win-win-win’ 
solutions that benefit all stakeholders (Walker, 2003). In this way the concept of 
active ageing promises to transcend policy conflicts.  
However, although the concept of active ageing has joined the illustrious group 
of ‘good ideas’ that rattle around in European polities, it has yet to attain a 
prominent position on European policy agendas. In most European countries 
(with the exception of Finland, see Piekkola, 2003), active ageing is a political 
backwater. Commitment from policy-makers in the main is of more rhetorical 
than practical value and the governance resources devoted to developing active 
ageing policies are modest. Part of the problem is that demographic ageing is 
an inherently transversal issue. It affects a wide variety of policy domains and 
policy communities in different ways. As a result, the institutional landscapes in 
which actors formulate and implement active ageing measures are fragmented 
vertically (across levels of governance) and horizontally (across thematic policy 
domains). In short, despite being a ‘good idea’, active ageing as a social reform 
programme has yet to catch on (Arend and Gsponer, 2003).  
The ActivAge project has set out to discover what it will take in terms of policy—
making for the active ageing idea to hold its promise. In the first phase of the 
project, the consortium mapped the institutional terrain that would-be reformers 
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need to navigate. In other word, our research aimed to understand how different 
institutional contexts in Europe impinge of active ageing policy agendas. 
Whether and how the idea of active ageing will go on to shape European social 
policy and welfare states will depend on two countervailing sets of institutional 
processes. The first set of institutional processes comprises what social policy 
researchers have called institutional path dependency (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Pierson, 1994, 1996, 2001; Palier and Bonoli, 2001). This institutional logic 
reproduces country-specific differences in social welfare provision. In this way, it 
ensures that the active ageing reform agenda remains well within the 
evolutionary trajectory of existing institutional welfare provision. This institutional 
dynamic strengthens the case for situating social policy-making sovereignty at 
national level. The second set of institutional processes nudges active ageing 
agendas off established evolutionary trajectories. By decentralising social 
policy-making, it replaces few but significant institutional differences at national 
level by a host of sectoral and problem-oriented differences at subpolitical level. 
Nonetheless, the thinking and the policy measures that emerge from these 
policy networks across Europe show a remarkable degree of coherence.  
Perhaps surprisingly, this strengthens the argument in favour of supranational 
policy coordination.   
The next two sections show how the countervailing institutional processes lead 
to very different policy outcomes. In Section 2, the report outlines how the 
institutional structures of different welfare state regimes lead policy-makers to 
formulate characteristic policy responses to demographic ageing. Section 3 
then goes on to illustrate how policy communities peripheral to the core welfare 
state institutions have developed common policy practices, a coherent critique 
of current social policy-making, as well as an active ageing policy programme. 
What is more, this section shows how welfare states themselves are changing 
in ways not predicted by institutional path dependency. The concluding section 
looks at the barriers and opportunities for active ageing policy agendas that 
emerge from the current European institutional and policy landscapes. 
 
2 Institutional Path Dependency: Active Ageing Policy in the 
Heart of Welfare States 
Across Europe, institutions of social welfare shape active ageing policy agendas 
in divergent ways. Path dependency, argue social scientists such as Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen (1990), Paul Pierson (2001) or Bruno Palier (2001), 
determines policy-making using three institutional channels. First, welfare states 
translate general social phenomena (e.g. demographic ageing) into specific 
policy issues (e.g. the financial sustainability of pension systems). Second, 
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welfare state regimes structure the policy networks and policy arenas that 
process the ageing issue. In this way, welfare state regimes empower some 
actors while excluding others from the policy process. Last, welfare state 
regimes give rise to characteristic types of policy outputs. 
2.1 Path Dependency and Policy Problems 
By defining certain conditions as undesirable social risks, by protecting certain 
groups against these social risks, and by choosing certain policy instruments, 
welfare state institutions articulate social policy problems. Demographic ageing 
in itself is not a social policy problem; it is even arguable to what extent the 
prospect of living longer, healthier lives is a problem at all. Within an institutional 
context, however, the consequences of low fertility rates and increasing life 
expectancy may very well exert strain on the viability and functioning of the 
system. At what points this strain will be felt depends on the design of the 
system. For this reason, welfare states from different regime types or families 
process demographic ageing according to their specific architecture. 
Nordic Welfare States 
In both Norway and Finland, policy-makers have defined demographic ageing 
as a problem of full employment. The Norwegian “de-luxe, top-of-the-range” 
welfare state has an in-built, systemic focus on labour market issues. Generous 
levels of universal benefits and services for wide range of social risks as well as 
a large public sector require a constant and substantial stream of tax revenues.  
Thus, avoiding poverty in old age while maintaining the high quality of 
Norwegian social provision means ensuring older people fully participate in the 
labour market. Despite the welfare state retrenchments in the wake of economic 
recession in the early 1990s, Finnish policy-makers also focus on maintaining 
high employment rates. Since ageing in Finland will set in earlier than in other 
European countries, Finnish policy-makers have looked for ways persuade 
older workers to remain in the work force. For this reason, occupational health 
and workplace well-being are central to Finnish active ageing policies. 
Continental Welfare States  
Continental European social insurance systems are caught in a triple squeeze. 
First, for contributions financed social insurance systems featuring generous 
income-related benefits, demographic ageing translates into a steep hike in 
contribution rates when the baby-boom generation starts retiring in 2010. 
Second, globalisation of goods and service markets are exerting a downward 
pressure on production costs just when unit labour costs in continental welfare 
state system are set to rise. The corresponding loss of competitiveness will lead 
to unemployment, which in turn exerts further pressure on social protections 
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systems. Third, labour market rigidities have meant that early retirement has 
been the policy tool of choice for easing socio-economic adjustment processes. 
However, this wide-spread practice magnifies the demographic pressures on 
social insurance systems. Consequently, the pressing social policy issue in 
continental welfare states is the financial viability of contribution-based PAYG 
social insurance systems.  
Western European Welfare States 
In Anglophone countries, the so-called “residual welfare-state” transforms 
demographic ageing into poverty and entitlement issues. Unlike continental 
European countries, demographic ageing is unlikely to exert excessive 
pressures on public finances. On the one hand, the ‘residual’ (or miserly) 
character of welfare state benefits in countries like the UK or Ireland merely 
protects individuals from falling into poverty: the main source of income in 
western European welfare systems is the labour market. On the other hand, 
reforms to pension and health care systems have contained and spread the 
costs of demographic ageing from the public to the private sector. Demographic 
ageing in western European welfare states, then, is not a threat to 
competitiveness or balanced public finances. Rather, the main policy issue in 
liberal welfare states is preventing poverty by providing access to employment. 
As a result, much of the ageing debate in the UK is framed in terms of barriers, 
rights and discrimination. Mayhew (2003) argues that age has become a proxy 
for assessing labour market capabilities. As a result, many older people are 
finding they are excluded from employment, health care or education services. 
Policy debate in the UK is about identifying and removing physical, mental and 
organisational barriers to labour market participation. 
Central and Eastern European Welfare States 
In the countries of central and Eastern Europe, socio-economic and political 
transition has produced a distinctive set of policy challenges. Unlike continental 
countries such Germany or France, new Member States also face issues of 
governance capacity and capability. Although countries like Poland and the 
Czech Republic differ in many respects (size, political culture, social economic 
structure, etc), both countries feature bottlenecks in governance capability. 
While the socialist legacy means that central government is well developed in 
most new Member States, local and regional government capabilities are still 
emerging. After all, local and regional government are new and still need to 
define their roles and responsibilities. The same is true (possibly more so) for 
civil society organisations. While the last decade has seen an upsurge in NGO 
activity, much of this activity is still falling short of its full potential. Lack of 
funding, poor communication structures and inadequate access to decision-
making hamper effective interest representation. At present, charities and 
NGOs that represent older people are too small, too scattered and too 
fragmented to make much of an impact (Perek-Bialas et al., 2003). 
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2.2 Path Dependency and Policy-Making 
Welfare state institutions cast and choreograph social policy-making ballets in 
Europe. Institutional structures and practices only determine who takes part in 
policy debate, they also stage these political conflicts in specific policy venues. 
Significantly, the way welfare state institutions stage and direct policy conflicts 
lays down the rules of social policy mobilisation and interaction. Unlike the 
provision of social welfare, policy-making itself varies little across different 
welfare states. While policy networks and policy styles in the UK differ markedly 
from the rest of Europe, policy processes in Nordic countries resemble social 
policy-making on the rest of the European continent1. 
Who’s In, Who’s Out 
Institutional path dependency determines who takes part in the social policy 
process. In E.E. Schattschneider’s (1960) terms, welfare states designate who 
is organised into and who is organised out of politics. In northern, continental 
and Eastern Europe, social policy emerges from a stylised institutional dialogue 
between social classes. That is, institutional path dependency limits effective 
participation in social policy-making to organised representatives of employers 
(capital) and employees (labour). The underlying assumption is that organised 
interest representation adequately covers policy issues of all social groups, 
including women, the disabled or, notably, the old. Policy-making is a bi- or tri-
partite bargaining process between state organisations (usually central 
ministries) and so-called social partner organisations (centralised trade unions 
and employers’ representatives). Authorised expertise and research support the 
negotiation process by furnishing the negotiating parties with data.  
Policy interaction in these corporatist policy communities is a carefully 
controlled process. Since sustained principled policy conflict undermines the 
legitimacy of this decision-making process2, class-based social dialogue 
                                                     
1 This is in line with Karl Hinrich’s (1999) contention that we have to distinguish welfare 
states in terms of their historical evolution rather than abstract institutional variables. On 
this view, existing welfare states unambiguously belong to one of two categories: the 
Bismarckian social insurance tradition or the Beveridgian universalist approach.  
2 Implicitly, processes of social dialogue rest on a technocratic rather than democratic 
legitimation. Rather than giving citizens or, based on a pluralist model, all relevant 
interest groups an effective voice in social policy-making, the exclusionary class-based 
social dialogue, via the so-called social policy consensus, claims two things. First, 
protagonists claim that reliable welfare provision, particularly old age income, requires a 
stable long-term political environment. For this reason, policy-makers should avoid 
excessive debate on welfare state provision; where debate is unavoidable, policy makers 
should limit participation to designated experts. Second, in many ways a corollary of the 
previous points, elite social policy-makers have justified the absence of effective political 
contestation in terms of their access to superior knowledge and technical skill for solving 
social problems (Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993). The so-called social policy consensus 
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inherently seeks consensus. Members of these closed and exclusive policy 
communities control conflict by non-decisions (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 
Smith, 1993; Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993; Ney, 2003a): in the past, reform 
agendas have rarely threatened the fundamental institutions of existing welfare 
provision. Whenever tri-partite policy actors suggest reforming basic structures, 
these have gone hand in glove with critical debates about the legitimacy of 
corporatist social policy-making. 
Social policy-making by non-decision has given rise to two types of opposition. 
The former type, the authorised political opposition, contests issues within a 
given social policy consensus. Here, social partners argue and bargain about 
detailed technical adjustments rather than normative reforms. Ostensibly, these 
‘technical’ adjustments aim to efficiently fine-tune welfare systems. The second 
type of opposition contests the social policy consensus and thereby the 
corporatist mode of social policy-making itself. Protagonists, usually but not 
necessarily policy actors outside the authorised social policy process (c.f. Ney, 
2003; Hinrichs and Aleksandrowicz, 2003), aim to rebuild the welfare state 
according to a set of policy principles at odds with the existing institutional logic 
of provision.  
Between Sir William Beveridge’s universalist vision of social welfare and the 
centralist traditions of Whitehall, social policy-making in the UK stands out from 
the rest of Europe. Whereas social policy in other European countries occupies 
a unique and somewhat privileged position, welfare state regulation in the UK is 
no different, in systemic terms, from any other policy domain, say education or 
environment3. In general, welfare state policy emerges from a quasi-pluralist, 
consultative policy process. Policy subsystems dealing with social policy issues 
are relatively open in terms of organisational membership: state institutions 
(again mostly ministries and executive agencies) interact with a number of 
charities and NGOs (e.g. Help The Aged or Age Concern) as well as think-tanks 
and journalists. Unlike social policy communities in the rest of Europe, social 
policy-making in the UK is more receptive to activities in other policy domains. 
Fundamental policy conflict, particularly over the NHS and pension provision, is 
common. It takes place between loose coalitions of policy actors that coalesce 
around a particular set of policy beliefs4. However, looser interorganisational 
ties mean that the British government and public administration are neither as 
                                                                                                                                 
articulates this claim. Sustained principled policy conflict about the fundamental 
institutional logic of  welfare provision within these systems would necessarily undermine 
the claim that there is one best way of providing social welfare.  
3 Please note that this is not to say that all policy domains in the UK are the same and 
follow similar rules. It does mean, however, that the differences in policy style between 
the education system and the pension system in the UK is not as dramatic as in, say, 
Germany or Austria.  
4 The technical term is an “advocacy coalition” (c.f. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
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deeply implicated nor as dependent on the process of social dialogue as their 
colleagues in the rest of Europe. This and the Westminster parliamentary model 
mean that British government can choose to listen to the policy advice it sees 
fit5.  
Setting the Stage 
Welfare states provide the stage and setting on which social policy-making 
takes place. Across Europe, the types of ‘locations’ and venues for social 
policy-making are roughly the same. In general, policy-making occurs in a web 
of ad hoc organisations. These include expert commission (e.g. the 
Pensionsreformskommission in Austria or the Hartz Kommission in Germany), 
permanent and transient bi-or tri-partite boards (e.g. Norway’s contact 
committee or the Czech Republic’s Board for Business and Social 
Cooperation), consultative bodies (e.g. NICE in the UK), coalition committees 
(e.g. in Austria and Germany) and interministerial working groups (most notably 
in Finland but also in Germany)6. Additionally, political parties, trade unions, or 
employer’s organisations provide an organisational context for informal contacts 
between different policy actors.  
Venues for social policy-making are well insulated from three sources of critical 
scrutiny. First, since welfare state reform in the context of “permanent austerity” 
means applying losses on specific political constituencies (Pierson, 1996, 
2001), much of social policy-making in Europe is about avoiding overt policy 
conflict and parliamentary confrontation (Pabst, 1999; Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993; 
Pierson, 2001). Consequently, the complex networks of venues are remote from 
parliament and inaccessible to citizens. Second, in addition to keeping social 
policy out of democratic control’s way, social policy venues also shield social 
dialogue from the critical scrutiny of other policy communities. The only, albeit 
very significant, exception is that social policy across Europe is subject to 
continuing control by fiscal and financial policy communities. By providing ever 
tighter fiscal frameworks, treasuries in all European countries have effectively 
set the policy goals for contemporary social policy. Last, the organisational 
venues for welfare state policy are located at the national or central level of 
governance in all countries. Up until very recently, national policy-making 
                                                     
5 Paul Pierson (1993, 1994, 1996, 2001) argues convincingly the Westminster model  
does not make governing as easy as all that. He contends that the concentration of 
power in the Westminister model also implies a concentration of accountability: if things 
go wrong, voters will know whom to punish at the ballot box. The institutionalised social 
dialogue, in turn, diffuses and masks political blame behind consensus-politics and 
technical details.  
6 This is by no means an exhaustive list. The social policy-making ad hocracy tends to 
wax and wane as issues move up and down the political agenda. In most cases, it is 
difficult for outside observers (and even participants in the processes) to determine what 
committee, commission or board is decisive at what particular point of the policy process.   
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platforms have been impervious to influence from both the supra-national (i.e. 
EU) and local levels. While institutional and individual policy actors at the local 
level in most European countries are responsible for the implementation rather 
than the formulation of social policy, institutions of the European Union are wary 
of being seen to encroach on subsidiarity.  
Notable exceptions here are the countries of central and eastern Europe. 
Political and economic transition has made policy-makers more receptive to 
new ideas and new approaches. International organisations, most prominently 
the World Bank, the OECD, or USAID, have been instrumental in injecting ideas 
of welfare state “modernisation”, usually along the lines of the so-called 
Washington Consensus, into reform debates in central and eastern Europe. The 
strategic deployment of so-called “technical assistance” in reform processes 
explains why countries like Poland, Hungary and, to a lesser extent, the Czech 
Republic have decided against the European social model (Müller, 1999; 
Orenstein, 2000; Perek-Bialas et al. 2001; Perek-Bialas et al, 2003). In short, 
social policy communities of central and eastern Europe have been far more 
open to external stimuli than their counterparts in the old Member States. 
The Rules of Engagement 
Institutions not only structure the political game for those inside social policy 
processes. By determining the forms of political mobilisation and the rules of 
political engagement, welfare states influence the participation of older people 
in social policy-making. In most European countries, this constitutes a 
significant institutional barrier to the political participation of older people.  
In social insurance welfare states, the social dialogue is the template for 
organised political participation of older people. In the corporatist policy 
processes, particularly Austria, France, Germany and Italy, the political 
aspirations of older people often fail to clear the institutional hurdles imposed by 
consociational processes. In the cases that senior citizen and pensioners 
organisations reproduce the appropriate structures, most notably Austria and, to 
a lesser extent, Germany (Leichsenring and Strümpel, 1999; Walker and 
Naegele, 1999; Aleksandrowiczs and Hinrichs, 2003; Ney, 2003), the potential 
political impact has dissipated in consociational structures running parallel to 
the real policy processes. While these advisory councils both at regional and 
national level (c.f. Ney, 2003b) certainly help promote ageing and active ageing 
issues, they have fallen far short of expectations. In a very real sense, by 
mimicking the institutionalised social dialogue, policy-makers have been able to 
keep organisations representing older people at arm’s length from social policy-
making.  
Despite the more open and transparent nature of social policy-making in the 
UK, the system does not necessarily champion the political emancipation and 
empowerment of older people. Notions of philanthropy and charity, remnants of 
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Victorian England, colour the British engagement with the social in general and 
with older people in particular. Just like welfare benefits have never quite 
shaken the association with 19th century Poor Laws, charity, rather than political 
autonomy, dominates the representation of older peoples’ interest in 
contemporary Britain. What all of these charities have in common, however, is 
that they are organisations for rather than by older people. Critical voices have 
argued that charities, which depend on donations, often resort to portraying 
older people as helpless and needy. In this way, charities reproduce wide-
spread ageism based on misperceptions about the capabilities older people. 
Moreover, their proximity to government, some argue, disqualifies these 
organisations from representing the interests of older people. 
In the countries of central and eastern Europe, the forms of political participation 
and mobilisation are in flux. In many ways, civil society actors in central and 
eastern European countries are in the process of forging a new institutional path 
rather than coping with the restrictions of inherited institutional legacies. While 
civil society activity was common under socialism7, rapid socio-economic 
change has undermined organisational capabilities for the representation of 
older people. Despite the differences in the general approach to active ageing 
between Poland and the Czech Republic (see following section), the 
representation of older people’s interests depends in large part on the 
commitment particular individuals (Vidovicova et al., 2003; Perek-Bialas, et al., 
2003). Outside the organised corporatist representation of pensioner’s interests, 
particularly in the Czech Republic, the institutional landscape of NGOs is 
characterised by small-scale, poorly funded and scattered organisations. Along 
with the newly formed regional governments in the New Member States, civil 
society organisations are in the process of rediscovering and defining their new 
roles and functions. However, for many smaller NGOs and senior citizen 
organisations, economic restructuring and the attendant economic downturn in 
the 1990s has made the task of redefining the role of civil society considerably 
more difficult.  
In general, then, the rules of political mobilisation and participation that govern 
the institutions of European social policy-making have done little to promote the 
autonomous involvement of older people in socio-political life. The notable 
                                                     
7 A common misperception in the West is that state socialism successfully suppressed 
civil society and political contestation. Yet, even the most repressive regimes in the 
former East Bloc, such as the former GDR, could not completely contain civil society 
activities. The regimes in Poland and Hungary, in turn, even sustained explicitly critical 
political organisations such as, most prominently, Solidarinosc. So, civil society in central 
and eastern European countries was not the wasteland many in the West (somewhat 
arrogantly) were expecting to find after 1990.  
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exception is the European countries with an institutional legacy of direct 
democracy and political participation such as Switzerland and Nordic countries. 
In the latter case, particularly in Denmark and to a lesser extent in Norway, the 
traditions of local participation and self-governance have meant that senior 
citizen advisory councils, similar in structure their counterparts in Germany and 
Austria, are equipped with real political power. Similarly, the tradition of 
referenda at cantonal and federal level in Switzerland has significantly 
empowered older people. Yet, whereas elements of direct democracy in the 
Nordic countries have been a progressive force in the policy process, the voting 
power of older Swiss at the referenda ballot box has proved to be a 
conservative influence on ageing policy-making.  
2.3 Path Dependency and Policy Outputs 
The concept of path dependency implies that institutional structures provide 
policy–makers with a limited set of policy options and policy instruments. By 
suggesting a specific issue definition, by organising certain actors into and other 
actors out of policy-making and by determining the shape of policy processes, 
welfare state regimes ‘ensure’ their own survival by reproducing themselves in 
the face of each new policy challenge. The institutional and organisational 
means available to policy-makers determines the types of specific policy 
responses to general demographic trends. For this reason, national policy 
responses to demographic ageing differ along the lines of the institutional 
trajectories of different welfare state. 
Nordic Welfare States 
The full employment imperative of Nordic welfare states has concentrated 
ageing policy on encouraging older workers to remain in the labour force. While 
this policy goal is by no means limited to Nordic welfare states, policy-makers in 
Finland and (to a lesser extent) Norway have pursued this objective in a 
characteristically ‘Nordic’ manner. Here, policy-makers encourage older workers 
to remain in their jobs by firm-level measures aimed at creating adequate 
individual and environmental capacities. These include adapting both the 
workplace to suit the special needs of older workers as well as changing the 
skills profile of older workers themselves. 
The Finnish active ageing policy is a particularly comprehensive and coherent 
example of this approach. In three national programmes aimed at retraining 
older workers (National Programme on Ageing Workers 1998-2002), adapting 
work-places (National Well-being at Work Programme), as well as encouraging 
on-the-job training and life-long learning (Workplace Development Programme), 
Finnish policy-makers tackle the immanent drain of skill and experience from 
the labour market. Commentators point to three success factors. First, Finnish 
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responses to demographic ageing emerge from an egalitarian tri-partite policy 
process. Not only are social partners involved in all phases of decision-making, 
this process also features intensive cooperation between different ministries 
(e.g. the ministry of labour and the ministry of health). Second, the programmes 
enjoy strong research support and monitoring. At each stage of the project life-
cycle, public health and labour market researchers survey and evaluate the 
impact of the programmes. Last, the policy measures that emerge from the tri-
partite and knowledge-driven policy process specifically target the firm-level. 
That is, Finnish national programmes are directly relevant for the real working 
environments.  
While economic decline coupled with an early onset of the demographic shift 
prompted Finnish policy-makers into decisive policy action early on, Norwegian 
policy-makers have no such incentive. On the contrary, oil revenues have 
sheltered Norwegian decision-makers from the harsh climate of ‘permanent 
austerity’ that describes social policy-making elsewhere in Europe. 
Nonetheless, Norway’s society is ageing and Norwegian policy-makers are 
increasingly concerned about future developments. Although not pursued with 
quite the same vigour as in Finland, active ageing is also on the Norwegian 
policy agenda (Christensen, 2003). This is partly because ‘activation’ is an 
essential policy instrument in the Norwegian labour market toolbox 
(Christensen, 2003). Partly, however, policy-makers have realised that an 
ageing workforce has different needs than a younger workforce. In response, 
Norwegian policy-makers have initiated a set of policy measures aimed at 
producing “inclusive workplaces”. Similar in character to the national ageing 
programmes in Finland, the underlying logic of this policy approach is to 
encourage older workers to remain in employment by changing work-
environments as well as the capabilities and skills of older workers themselves.   
Path dependent policy responses to ageing in Nordic countries are essentially 
positive. In order to encourage older workers to remain in the labour force, 
Nordic policy-makers have primarily relied on policy measures that build new 
and maximise existing capabilities. Core elements of this policy strategy include 
creating institutional capacity on the one hand (i.e. the creation of policy 
coordination organisations in both Norway and Finland) and individual capacity 
(i.e. training, further education and life-long learning) on the other. The 
underlying policy rationale is that re-equipping both older workers and their 
work-places with the necessary arsenal of skills and features nips demand for 
expensive welfare state benefits in the bud. 
Continental Welfare States 
In Bismarckian welfare states, policy causality seems to run exactly the other 
way. Rather than understanding full employment and active labour market 
policy as a way of relieving demographic pressure on social security systems, it 
is social protection that are exacerbating demographic strain on labour markets 
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and depressing employment rates. For this reason, the social insurance edifice 
itself is the primary target for ageing policy. The aim of retrenchments to social 
insurance systems is to deter workers from early retirement. 
Reforms to social insurance systems, most prominently pension systems, have 
dominated policy agendas in continental Europe. Policy-makers have deployed 
a wide-ranging arsenal of formal-legal instruments to raise the statutory and 
actual retirement ages. Apart from reducing many so-called non-contributory 
benefits, policy-makers have manipulated pension benefit formulas in a 
multitude of ways. These include increasing qualification periods (e.g. France 
and Austria), reconfiguring annual pension adjustment arrangements (e.g. 
France, Germany and Austria), and building factors into the formula that adjust 
pension benefits to changes in life expectancy (Germany). In some countries, 
notably Italy and Germany, pension reforms have shifted the systems from 
defined benefit to defined contribution schemes (explicitly in the Italian case, 
implicitly in Germany). What is more, policy-makers have tried to prevent 
workers from retiring early by closing down popular avenues out of the labour 
market, most notably disability pensions. In all continental countries (except 
Austria), pension reforms also created the legal framework for the provision of 
old-age income outside public pension systems. These reforms in Bismarckian 
welfare states consist entirely of top-down command-and-control measures, 
usually in the form of statutes. Bismarckian welfare states, policy responses to 
demographic ageing are about remote manipulation of social insurance 
institutions. 
Rather than reforming labour markets to curb the demand for social protection 
systems as in Nordic countries, policy-makers on the continent have targeted 
social insurance systems. Recent reforms in conservative welfare states have 
closed down alternatives to labour market participation for older workers. 
However, they have done this without corresponding reforms in labour markets. 
In this sense, ageing policy in continental Europe is a negative exercise in 
retrenchment and redesign. Here, the underlying logic has been to ‘roll back’ 
public provision hoping that the private sector can cover the shortfall.  
Western European Welfare States 
Unlike the rest of Europe, policy responses to ageing in liberal welfare states 
are inherently more fragmented and dispersed across different policy 
communities. For this reason, the objectives of policy responses to ageing are 
probably less coherent (or more incoherent) than in Nordic or continental social 
policy systems. Nonetheless, British ageing policy aims to retain workers in 
employment for as long as possible by identifying and removing barriers to the 
labour market. 
In order to enable fair access to employment for older workers, policy-makers 
use a wide-range of direct and indirect policy instruments. Direct policy 
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instruments target obstacles to the labour market, to health care, or to 
education services. Here, policy instruments range from self-regulation (always 
popular in post-Thatcherite Britain) in the form on voluntary codes of practice on 
age diversity to watch-dog institutions such as the Disability Rights 
Commission. In between, we find a whole host of ‘atmospheric’ policy measures 
designed to reshape misperceptions about older workers. The field of indirect 
policy measures is even more difficult to delimit: these include changes to tax 
regimes for individuals and firms, building and environmental regulations that 
will empower people with disabilities, or new approaches to providing health 
care.  
In general, then, Beveridgian welfare states aim at providing the right socio-
cultural conditions for building and developing capacities. Unlike the Nordic or 
continental welfare state set-ups, the policy focus in English-speaking countries 
is not concerned with the actual construction and development of capabilities. 
Instead, ageing policy in the UK is about defining legitimate social, political and 
economic entitlements for older people and then provides fair access to these 
rights. In short, policy responses to demographic change in liberal systems are 
about identifying and removing illegitimate barriers to societal and economic 
participation. 
Central and Eastern European Welfare States 
The collective journey from one socio-economic location to another shapes 
ageing policy outputs in central and eastern Europe in two fundamental ways. 
First, in both the Czech Republic and Poland, policy responses to demographic 
ageing reflect the way these countries deal with socio-economic and political 
‘modernisation’. While ageing policy is a vehicle for breaking with the past in 
one country, it has become a means of creating some form of continuity in the 
other. For example, pension reform in Poland8 in the late 1990s not only 
represents a radical break with the socialist legacy but also with European 
social protection models in general. Although policy-makers in the Czech 
Republic have been reluctant to abandon what, after all, were reasonably 
functional social protection mechanisms, the Czech polity is among the few 
polities in Europe to have formulated a coherent, knowledge-driven, and 
comprehensive national policy programme for active ageing (Vidovicova et al., 
2003). Between 1999 and 2002, Czech policy-makers and experts launched an 
ambitious and well-crafted policy initiative (The National Programme for the 
Preparation For Ageing 2003-2007) aimed at activating older people. 
Vidovicova et al. (2003) point out that the new ageing policy agenda bears a 
striking resemblance to the ageing plan devised in Czechoslovakia in 1985. 
However, both the process and policy outcome are exemplary and unique in 
                                                     
8 As well as in Hungary and the Baltic States (Müller, 1999; Orenstein 2002). 
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Europe. Thus, on active ageing, Czech policy-makers and experts are also 
rapidly leaving behind most other European polities by rebottling old wine. 
Second, transition also shapes active ageing policy outputs in a more 
pernicious way. As we have seen, the fundamental policy issue in central and 
eastern European countries is the lack of governance capacity in public, private 
and tertiary sectors. Despite being far too early to evaluate, critical 
commentators of the more radical pension reforms in central and eastern 
Europe question whether the private insurance sector will be able to perform as 
promised. Moreover, in Poland the first stages of implementing the 1998 
pension reform ran into difficulties because of administrative shortfalls in the 
public social insurance institution (ZUS) (Perek-Bialas et al., 2001): in part, the 
ZUS lacked the computing and staff capacities to implement the NDC pension 
accounts. In general, Perek-Bialas et aI. (2003) argue that active ageing policy 
disappears from its already tenuous position in the Polish policy agenda as 
soon as the economy slows down. Similarly, the economic costs of transition, 
low growth rates and relatively high unemployment have suspended the 
implementation of the comprehensive Czech active ageing programme.  
2.4 Implications for European Active Ageing Policy Agendas  
The different institutional legacies of European social protection shape the goals 
and means of active ageing policy in Europe. Although European policy-makers 
currently face similar general problems associated with demographic ageing, 
the way these issues get articulated into specific policy problems as well as the 
types of policy instruments at disposal of policy actors differ from one welfare 
state regime to another. As we have seen, Nordic welfare states will translate 
demographic pressures into labour market issues for which policy-makers find 
positive, immediate policy solutions at the level of the firm. In welfare states of 
the continental-conservative family, policy-makers focus on the financial 
sustainability and economic viability of social insurance edifices; here, solutions 
will take the form of remote top-down policy measures. Welfare states in 
western Europe, in turn, define demographic ageing in terms of poverty and 
entitlements. Policy approaches aim to break down barriers and enable access 
to the labour market, politics and society. Here, policy actors prefer policy 
instruments that work with the market. In central and eastern European 
countries, the process of transition determines active ageing policies both in the 
basic approach to socio-economic modernisation as well as the constraints on 
governance capability. At this level of analysis, European countries will continue 
to tread on the paths forged for them long ago. 
What does this mean for the European active ageing policy agenda? 
Institutional path dependency implies that social policy agendas in Europe will 
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continue to diverge in significant ways as policy-makers respond specific issues 
that emerge from welfare state regimes. Any active ageing policy agenda at 
European level will have to take into account and work with the institutional 
variety characteristic of European welfare states. For European policy-makers, 
institutional path dependency means that the adequate institutional context for 
formulating and implementing responses to demographic ageing will continue to 
be the national level. While policy actors at European level can formulate broad 
goals (e.g. 50% employment rate 54-64 age group by 2010), effective and 
strategic policy concepts emerge from the level of national welfare states. 
Moreover, institutional path dependency and lock-in also mean experiences in 
other European countries are of academic interest but have no policy-making 
relevance outside their specific institutional context.  
However, there is reason to believe (and indeed evidence from the ActivAge 
project to suggest) that path dependency is not the primary, let alone only, 
institutional process shaping active ageing agendas. Two sets of circumstances 
should give cause to reconsider some of the stronger claims of the New 
Institutionalists (Bonoli, 2000; Bonoli and Palier, 2001).  
First, the ActivAge research revealed considerable differences between 
countries within welfare state families. For example, policy responses to 
demographic ageing in Norway resemble the comprehensive Finnish 
programmes only in their general concern for labour market participation. While 
Finnish policy-makers have constructed and inter-disciplinary and multi-level 
policy framework, Norwegian policy actors have been content to strengthen the 
arbeidslinja by systemic reforms to pension systems. Christensen (2003) 
argues that the ‘inclusive workplace’ initiatives have not been particularly 
successful. Similarly, recent pension reform experiences across continental 
Europe have resulted in disparate outcomes. At one end of the spectrum, Italian 
pension reforms of the 1990s have de- and reconstructed old-age income 
provision (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000; Turcio et al. 2001). At the other end of 
the spectrum, pension reform in Austria has merely (yet significantly) retrenched  
pension benefits for workers while (in line with inbuilt distributional inequities) 
more or less leaving civil servants old-age pensions untouched. The outcomes 
of pension reforms in Germany and France lie somewhere in-between: apart 
from tying benefits closer to contributions, reforms in both countries have set up 
legal frameworks for old-age income provision outside public social insurance 
systems.  
Second, the ActivAge research has also shown that, regardless of particular 
institutional legacies, there are significant similarities between active ageing 
policy outputs. A comparison of the entire, admittedly fragmented, spectrum of 
active ageing policy measures in different countries does not reveal patterns 
suggestive of institutional path dependency. Undoubtedly welfare state 
structures, different policy communities and, not to forget, differing public 
spheres prioritise certain policy issues over others. However, this is not to say 
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that policy-makers operating in, say, a continental welfare state context 
slavishly reproduce social insurance structures. In fact, the ActivAge project 
demonstrates that the active ageing policy context gives rise to policies that 
deviate from institutional trajectories. Table 1 provides an overview of the types 
of policies that sit awkwardly in (a strict interpretation of) existing welfare state 
regimes. So while welfare state regimes determine policy instruments, policy-
makers are far less constrained in their policy options and policy goals as the 
New Institutionalist literature suggests. Admittedly, many of these ‘aberrant’ 
policy initiatives and measures are marginal to the main thrust of social policy. 
Nonetheless, the fact that these strands exist at all indicates that something in 
addition to institutional path dependency is going on.   
 
3 Institutional Path Departure: Active Ageing Policy at the 
Margins of Welfare States 
Alongside the institutional dynamics that cause social policy agendas in Europe 
to drift apart at the macro-institutional level, a countervailing set of institutional 
processes is at work at the meso-level. At this level of analysis, differences 
between families of welfare states are far less significant than differences 
between structures, norms and practices of policy subsystems. In other words, 
the practical issues and problems involved in, say, the provision of local social 
services may be far more similar across national boundaries than the 
differences in welfare state regimes would suggest.  
These centrifugal institutional dynamics consist of three elements. First, since 
active ageing is a transversal issue, it involves policy domains where 
institutional structures and practices are quite foreign to those of the welfare 
state heartland. Second, a critical pan-European policy discourse centred on 
the concept of senior citizenship has emerged from within these institutional 
landscapes. This discourse fundamentally challenges the way policy-makers 
define and deal with demographic ageing. Last, path dependency and 
institutional lock-in have not prevented European policy-makers from 
implementing structural reforms to prevalent social protection systems. 
Consequently, European welfare states are changing in terms of their 
organisational structures, their underlying ideologies and their institutional 
practices.  
3.1 Alternative Institutional Landscapes  
Ageing will affect most parts of European society in one way or another. 
Although traditional benefit transfer systems (i.e. pension systems, health 
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insurance, etc.) will play a pivotal role in any active ageing strategy, they will 
have to operate alongside (and preferably in harmony with) service-oriented 
social provision. Specifically, these are policy networks geared towards 
providing local health and social services on the one hand and, albeit to a far 
lesser extent, policy communities providing educational services to adults on 
the other. In many European countries, organisational networks for formulating 
senior citizen policy relate directly or indirectly to these service-oriented policy 
communities. 
In most European countries, providing services (of any kind) is a different 
administrative, organisational and, not least, political game from transferring 
cash benefits. As a rule, providing and managing services is considerably more 
messy and complex. What is more, service provision implies proximity to 
recipients of these services. There is, then, a strong local and regional flavour to 
active ageing policy-making which sets it off from, say, pension reform.   
What, then, are the organisational characteristics of these service-oriented 
policy networks? 
Membership 
Policy networks geared towards designing and administering social services are 
both more populous and pluralist than core welfare state institutions. Apart from 
consociational social policy players, these policy networks consist of a wide 
range of NGOs, experts, and regional governments. In general, organisations in 
these service-oriented policy networks pursue a wide variety of missions and 
interests. The NGOs in service-oriented social policy communities include large 
humanitarian organisations (such as the Red Cross), church-based aid 
organisations (such as the Caritas or Diakonie in German-speaking countries), 
generalist social policy NGOs (such as SoVD and Reichsbund in Germany, 
Volkshilfe or Hilfsbund in Austria), special issue organisations (such as societies 
representing people with particular diseases or impairments, e.g. Alzheimers or 
Osteoporosis), and senior citizen organisations.  
Within service-oriented policy networks, senior citizen organisations come in 
many different guises. Some are affiliated to mainstream political parties or 
social partners. Most major political parties in continental Europe feature a unit 
designated to senior citizen policy-making (e.g. SPD Senioren in Germany, both 
the ÖSB and PVÖ in Austria). Similarly, many trade unions federations host 
pensioner’s interest groups: examples include the ÖGB Pensionisten in Austria 
or the Association of Pensioners and Trade Unionists in the Czech Republic. 
Other senior citizen organisations are non-partisan NGOs organised by or for 
older persons. The pan-European NGO EURAG is an example for the former 
while British Age Concern or the German KDA are examples of the latter. 
Additionally, service-oriented policy networks also comprise a plethora of small 
organisations ranging from charities that provide local social services (such as 
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meals on wheels) as well as organisations that provide leisure and cultural 
activities. Private social service providers, while still of marginal importance in 
most countries9, are increasingly becoming a feature of social service provision. 
Marginal and service-oriented social policy communities also house a different 
type of expert to core welfare state networks. In general, marginal social policy 
communities are the preserve of social gerontologists, social psychologists and 
age-related sociologists. Organisationally, much of this knowledge production 
takes place in specialist university departments (such as ageing centres at 
Oxford Brookes or at Sheffield University) but also in specialised research 
organisations (such as the DZA in Berlin or the Senter for Seniorpolitikk in 
Oslo). In the latter case, the research organisation actively takes part in policy 
formulation, implementation and evaluation (Christensen, 2003).  
Since service provision always takes place in a local context, regional and local 
government are pivotal players in service-oriented policy communities. Often, 
regional and local government operate alongside central ministries within these 
networks. However, the portfolio of responsibilities for local and regional 
governments is usually far wider than for central government.  
Structure and Integration 
Organisational diversity and variation in service-oriented policy networks have 
meant that these communities are far less cohesive than core welfare state 
networks. As we have seen, patterns of transaction between the comparatively 
few organisations that make up core welfare state networks, most prominently 
pension provision, are explicitly delimited, tightly regulated and remain stable 
over time10. In the verdant organisational ecologies of service-oriented policy 
systems, the relationships between different types of organisations evolve 
continuously.  
In place of the formalised and ritualised bargaining process of corporatist 
decision-making systems, organisations in service-oriented and marginal policy 
communities interact in a number of formal and informal ways. A common form 
of interaction and cooperation is the policy project. Often, central state 
organisations fund and participate in these types of projects that are the only 
means of survival for many smaller NGOs. The types of projects range from 
research and evaluation over policy-design and demonstration to awareness-
raising initiatives. Larger organisations such as the Red Cross also initiate and 
                                                     
9 With the possible exception of the UK where private nursing homes for elderly are well-
established. 
10 This is true both for corporatist decision-making systems as it is for more open British 
social policy networks (c.f. Richardson and Jordan, 1983). Despite open policy networks 
at the margin, the central policy community (in Richardson’s more anthorpological sense) 
remains stable over time. 
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coordinate policy projects with like-minded NGOs. Regional and local 
government often contracts out service provision to commercial and non-profit 
service providers; here, the types of services mostly include transport, out-
patient medical care, or the provision of hot meals. Over and above 
contractually-based and project-oriented cooperation, organisations also 
engage in multi-lateral informal interaction. For example, the five largest social 
service NGO’s in Austria have formed a platform for formulating common 
positions on ageing, disability and long-term care policy. 
While core welfare state policy networks distribute tasks and responsibilities 
hierarchically, the division of labour between organisations in marginal and 
service-oriented policy subsystem is poorly defined and fluid. In welfare state 
policy networks, central state actors (most commonly federal or national 
ministries) are responsible for policy formulation while social partners manage 
and oversee policy implementation11. Although policy actors in core welfare 
state policy subsystems honour the distinction far more in the breach than in 
compliance, the roles and relationships between organisations and individuals 
in marginal social policy networks is fundamentally ambiguous. As a rule, local 
authorities and regional governments fulfil several different, often conflicting 
roles. For example, most local authorities are responsible for formulating, 
regulating and implementing social and health care services; this is the case in 
both Austria and Germany. In Norway, the tradition of local self-determination 
means that local government provides and administers key welfare state 
services and benefits. Similarly, the Swiss cantons are pivotal for the design, 
administration and provision of social services to the old.  
Policy Styles and Policy Output 
Since the structure and interorganisational ties in service-oriented policy 
networks are loose, negotiable, and inherently in flux, they impose relatively few 
constraints on policy actors. As a result, policy styles tend to be problem-
oriented (e.g. the design, regulation and delivery of services) and knowledge-
driven. Project work implies that policy actors focus their attention on specific 
issues. For example, at the same time Austrian corporatist policy actors in core 
welfare state policy communities were reforming the pension system, policy 
actors in marginal and service-oriented policy communities were (among other 
things) looking into health and safety of older people at home as well as 
evaluating the feasibility of instituting a senior citizen ombudsman (Ney, 2003b). 
By the same token, social policy actors in the UK are pointing out that the way 
the design of physical environments will impede or empower older people will a 
central policy issue in the future (Mayhew, 2003). Since policy debate in 
                                                     
11 Although this hierarchical division of policy-making tasks tends to be more pronounced 
in countries with a corporatist institutional legacy, the next steps agencies (e.g. the Child 
Benefit Agency) in the UK are an attempt to keep policy formulation organisationally 
apart from policy implementation. 
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marginal and service-oriented policy subsystems takes place well out of the 
glare of the public sphere, policy actors can afford to disagree over policy 
issues.  
A consequence of relatively loose ties and unconstrained interaction is that 
service-oriented policy networks produce innovative solutions. Policy actors in 
these subsystems do not have the battery of policy instruments of the welfare 
state machinery at their disposal. Consequently, solving policy problems 
requires, at the very least, some invention and lateral thinking. Examples of 
innovations in this area are new models of multi-generational housing in Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland, new forms of mobile and out-patient care across the 
continent, or concepts of promoting intergenerational solidarity such as the 
nonno civile in Italy or the Seniorenbüros in Germany12. Even though the 
implementation of these policies and measures is inextricably intertwined with 
very local conditions, many of these ideas have travelled across national 
boundaries. The most prominent example here is the spread of senior citizen 
advisory councils throughout the 1990s. Although, as Alan Walker and Gerhard 
Naegele (1999) show, the structures and functions differ widely across Europe, 
the idea of providing older people with a political voice seems to have 
germinated in various institutional contexts. 
The downside of policy-making free from the constraints of the social 
partnership and the pressures of high-level policy-making is that it takes place 
in relative obscurity. As a result, resources for funding innovative (or indeed any 
type of) policy activities are scarce. As a rule, policy initiatives are small-scale, 
experimental and highly vulnerable to budget-cuts (e.g. multi-generational 
housing in Austria and Germany). The general public, even the target 
populations, are poorly informed and the media are generally disinterested 
(Ney, 2003b).  
In sum, service-oriented and marginal social policy communities are more 
populous and pluralist than their counterparts in core welfare state networks. 
Looser interorganisational ties mean that policy-making is problem-oriented and 
knowledge-driven. By widening the scope and type of policy actors in the 
debate, these policy subsystems expand the ageing issue from its narrow 
mainstream focus on the labour market and social protection systems. Thus, 
while the institutional contexts for policy subsystems in different countries 
diverge considerably, the way policy actors relate to each other as well as the 
fundamental problems in these networks are remarkably similar. 
                                                     
12 The Nonno Civile (Civic Grandfather or Grandparent) is an initiative by the Naples 
municipal council in which retired members of the community provide support and 
guidance to young people in danger of drifting into criminality. The Seniorenbüros (senior 
citizen offices) in Germany and their counterparts in Austria (Bürgerbüros für Jung und 
Alt) are designed to promote and coordinate the voluntary engagement of young and 
older citizens.  
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3.2 Senior Citizenship as a Critical Policy Discourse  
The second element of the countervailing institutional dynamic that shapes 
active ageing policy agendas in Europe is the emergence of a critical policy 
discourse centred on senior citizenship. In large part, this policy story has 
emerged from the service-oriented and problem-centred social policy 
communities at the margins of European welfare states. Nonetheless, this 
account of demographic ageing is not limited to any specific welfare state 
regime or country. Rather, policy actors across Europe are advocating policy-
makers adopt a holistic approach to understanding and acting upon the 
challenges of demographic ageing. Like any good story, the Senior Citizenship 
policy discourse start from a set of assumptions, identifies the problem, and 
proposes a solution. 
Assumptions 
Demographic ageing, advocates argue, is possibly the most pervasive and 
important policy challenge we will have to face in the 21st century. As societies, 
we stand at the verge of momentous social change: demographic ageing is 
likely to transform all aspects of economic, political and social life. Such a 
comprehensive challenge calls for an equally thorough policy response. In order 
to suitably address the challenges and opportunities of demographic ageing, 
advocates argue that we all must start taking a holistic approach to ageing. 
Understanding demographic ageing solely as a fiscal problem, labour market 
issue or problem of comparative advantage means erroneously and 
illegitimately reducing the complexity of ageing a single component part.   
For this reason, advocates such as Alan Walker (2003), Anton Amann (1999) or 
Gerhard Naegele (1999) urge researchers, policy-makers and citizens to adopt 
a life-cycle approach to understanding demographic ageing. Rather than 
concentrating on the fiscal, economic or employment aspects of ageing, the life-
cycle approach relates the interaction of a wide variety of factors to individual 
and collective well-being over time (Amann, 1999). In particular, this suggests 
analysis and policy-making should look at the complex associations between 
factors such as (among others) family life, employment, education, socio-
cultural participation, material security and health. Adopting a holistic view 
invariably entails that successful ageing policy-making addresses all 
generations: ageing policy is fundamentally about providing, extending and 
safeguarding political, economic and social rights for citizens of all ages. In 
short, citizenship for older people presupposes citizenship for everyone.  
Box 1 outlines the Walker’s seven principles of active ageing. 
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Walker’s seven key priniciples of Active Ageing Policy 
 Nature of Activity: “…’activity’ should consist of all meaningful pursuits 
which contribute to the well-being of the individual concerned, his or her 
family, local community or society at large and should not be concerned 
only with paid employment or production” (p.5) 
 Scope: “active ageing must encompass all older people, even those who 
are, to some extent, frail and dependent” (p.5) 
 Active ageing is/ should be a preventative concept. This implies adopting 
a ‘life course’ approach to understanding the ageing issue: active ageing 
policy, if it is to be effective, cannot solely concentrate on the current old 
but also needs to include policies for the future old  
 Centrality of intergenerational solidarity for active ageing policy: “This 
means fairness between generations as well as the opportunity to 
develop activities that span the generations” 
 Active ageing encompasses rights and obligations: “Thus the right to 
social protection, life-long learning and training and so on may be 
accompanied by obligations to take advantage of education and training 
opportunities and to remain active in other ways” (p.5) 
 Active ageing should be “participative and empowering”: bottom-up 
initiatives must qualify and complement top-down measures (p.6) 
 Active ageing has to respect national and cultural diversity in Europe: 
what counts as a ‘meaningful activity’ is likely ton differ across Europe.  
(p.6) 
 
Problems 
The root cause of all problems associated with demographic ageing, advocates 
argue, is age-based discrimination. Alan Walker (2003) contends that in our 
fundamentally inequitable societies   
“…in which a youth-good/old age-bad culture dominates employment, the 
media, popular culture and elsewhere (the family excepted), the 
contributions of older people are not valued to the same extent as those 
of younger people…” (p.19) 
Inaccurate perceptions and discriminating beliefs about the capabilities of older 
people allow us to relegate them to the margins of society. “Age discrimination”, 
Alan Walker argues, “is the antithesis of active ageing” (p.10). 
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Systemic ageism and inbuilt age discrimination, advocates of senior citizenship 
argue, give rise to policy problems in a wide range of societal arenas (Walker, 
2003; Amann, 1999). First, labour markets practices socially exclude older 
workers. In general, labour markets create and reinforce inequities between rich 
and poor, men and women, old and young. This is why advocates of the senior 
citizenship discourse can identify a series of ‘age barriers’ in labour markets 
across Europe. Located in firm-level employment practices, ‘age barriers’ 
prevent older workers from remaining in or rejoining the labour market. Walker 
(2003) argues that  
“…employers forced to reduce employment concentrate redundancies on 
older workers (often in agreement with trade unions) and, in turn, long-
term unemployment affects older workers more than younger ones” 
(Walker, 2003, p.9) 
As a result, older workers are, as a matter of course, ejected and barred from 
employment opportunities. 
Second, systems of old-age income provision reproduce and perpetuate labour 
markets inequities. Bismarckian social insurance models in particular extend 
social differences into retirement. Moreover, argue advocates, all European 
pension systems encourage early retirement and suppress any type of activity, 
economic or otherwise, after leaving the labour market. Dependency and 
inactivity, then, are designed into European pension systems.  
Third, health care systems across Europe are poorly configured to deal with 
demographic ageing. The traditional emphasis on remedial rather than 
preventative health care will not only increase health care costs but also will 
impose high toll on society in terms of foregone labour power (OECD, 1998). 
Health and activity, Walker argues, are dialectically related: good health is the 
precondition for an active life which, in turn, promotes good health. By the same 
token, research suggests that ill-health and employment also are intricately 
related. A policy that encourages (or forces) people to remain in the labour 
market must also address inequities in working conditions. Forcing workers to 
remain in dangerous, high-stress or unsuitable working environments for longer 
than necessary will merely increase work-related disease. In other words, 
effective active ageing policy needs to ‘uncouple’ the relationship between ill-
health and work (Walker, 2003). 
Fourth, all these policy measures imply the political emancipation of older 
people in Europe. The politics of old age, proponents argue, is subject to a 
paradox: just as demographic ageing increases the electoral clout of older 
people, their political significance seems to be in decline (Walker and Naegele, 
1999; Leichsenring and Strümpel, 1999). However, throughout the 1990s, 
bodies designed to give older people a political voice, such as senior citizen 
advisory councils, emerged in most European countries (Walker and Naegele, 
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1999). The form, institutional location and political influence of these bodies 
differs widely. While some bodies, notably regional advisory bodies in Denmark, 
provide older people with real political influence, others, most notably in Austria, 
absorb and dissipate the political aspirations of older people.  
What is more, argue the advocates of senior citizenship, the policy debate 
about ageing in all European countries is misguided. European policy-makers, 
stuck in institutional straightjackets of welfare state legacies, have concentrated 
on the symptoms rather than the root causes. While preoccupied with 
dependency ratios, rising social insurance contribution rates or increasing 
health care costs, Walker (2003) argues, policy-makers in Europe have nearly 
lost sight of the ‘real issue’: the “…economic activity rate and, specifically, 
unemployment among older people” (p.11). Rectifying this problem, though, will 
require unravelling the complex links between social inequities, ageism and 
social exclusion.  
Solutions 
An all encompassing issue such as demographic ageing, contend advocates of 
the senior citizenship discourse, requires a comprehensive and integrated 
policy response. An active ageing policy strategy worthy of the name, then, 
should aim at no less than a complete overhaul of discriminatory socio-
institutional norms and practices. This reform programme implies that we will 
have to fundamentally change the way we think and behave. 
A first but crucial step towards this goal, however, is for policy-makers to 
expand the scope of ageing policy-making. Active ageing policy, advocates 
suggest, needs to strategically exploit synergies across different policy 
domains. This implies that national policy-makers can no longer hide social 
policy-making behind the (increasingly thin) veil of subsidiarity: the socio-
cultural challenge of demographic ageing is the same for all Europeans. 
What broad policy goals should a European active ageing agenda pursue? Alan 
Walker (2003) outlines four area of importance. First, in order to overcome 
ageism in the labour market and attain the Lisbon targets, Europeans need 
active employment strategies (Amann, 1999). Policy-makers, he argues, should 
take into account that older people in the future will rely on four sources of 
income: income from public pension systems, from occupational pensions, from 
private savings and from earned income (c.f. Giarini and Liedtke, 1998). 
However, this implies that any policy limited to removing financial incentives to 
early retirement alone is likely to fail. Without simultaneously combating age 
discrimination, retrenching pension systems alone conscribes older people in 
marginal employment to poverty and destitution. Effective anti-discrimination 
policy, in turn, requires hands-on age management at the organisational level. 
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Second, advocates of the senior citizenship acknowledge that pension systems 
are in need of reform. However, unlike the general thrust of pension reform in 
Europe (with the notable exception of Norway), pension reform should aim at 
providing older people with the material means to fully participate in social life 
(Amann, 1999; Ney, 2003). For many marginal groups in the labour market, 
such as women or people with disabilities, this means that pension systems 
provide some form of basic or guaranteed minimal income regardless of prior 
contribution. What is more, pension systems should not erect barriers to labour 
market participation of older people. This implies abandoning mandatory 
retirement ages, reducing the punitive nature of taxation on earned income 
during retirement, as well promoting pension arrangements that permit part-time 
employment (Walker, 2003).  
Third, since good health is the pivotal precondition for activity in old age, any 
active ageing policy must weave health care and social services into the overall 
policy fabric. Rather than expending scarce policy-making resources on 
structural and financial reforms to health care systems, advocates of the senior 
citizenship discourse suggest reforming the underlying approach to providing 
health care. Avoiding skyrocketing health care costs in the future involves 
breaking the link between poor health and employment (Walker, 2003): 
European health care systems need to prevent ill-health rather than curing 
disease at great costs. Moreover, activity and societal participation for the very 
old and frail, a group set to increase considerably in the coming decades, call 
for effective long-term care. Here, the active ageing policy imperative is to 
develop innovative concepts of long-term care and social service provision.  
Last, but by no means least, any active ageing agenda must be about 
democracy, rights and citizenship. In a very real sense, combating 
discrimination in the labour market, providing adequate old-age income and 
ensuring good health in old age empowers older people. However, while 
societal reforms represent one side of what David Held (1995) calls “double 
democratisation”, real change in political systems is the indispensable other 
side. Active ageing policy, argue the advocates, has to provide older people 
(and, by extension, everyone) with a real say in decision-making. In this way, 
European citizens can take active control and responsibility for their ageing. 
This also includes promoting the civic engagement of older Europeans. 
Senior Citizenship and the New Politics of Ageing 
In sum, the active ageing policy agenda outlined by advocates of the senior 
citizenship discourse is nothing short of a socio-‘cultural revolution’. Not only 
structures but also fundamental societal values will have to change if we are to 
deal effectively with the formidable challenges of demographic ageing.  
As idealistic as the discourse and the policy vision it transports may appear, 
they nonetheless pose a seriously political challenge to established welfare 
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state policy communities for three interrelated reasons. First, the senior 
citizenship discourse makes a coherent, knowledge-based and, ultimately, 
attractive case for policy renewal. More importantly, however, the policy story 
makes a very strong public interest argument. In contrast, the adherence to 
consociational policy-processes is becoming increasingly difficult to justify in 
public interest terms; membership of established welfare state policy 
communities has acquired a (not quite unjustified) air of privilege. Second, the 
senior citizenship discourse feeds on the increasing impatience on part of the 
European citizens with tired and ineffective corporatist decision-making 
systems. The senior citizen discourse is the conceptual core of a transnational 
advocacy coalition consisting of policy actors (i.e. charities, service providers, 
NGOs, research organisations, and university professors) with considerably 
more political credibility than present social policy-makers. Third, the vision of 
active ageing as senior citizenship is an eminently sensible idea. Who in their 
right mind, after all, could possibly oppose more wealth, better health, and more 
political influence? And, as advocates assure us, all within easy reach. Although 
history would suggest that these sweeping socio-cultural changes are rare (not 
to mention usually triggered by undesirable events such as war, famine, 
epidemics, etc.), the senior citizenship discourse points out that we are in a 
historically unique situation. At present, a window of opportunity, a rare window 
at that, is open for sustainable and successful policy action: usually divergent 
interests of actors all converge on the active ageing strategy. In short, the 
concept of active ageing provides benefits to all stakeholders while imposing no 
costs.  
3.3 Path Departure in Welfare State Regimes 
The last aspect of the countervailing institutional dynamic in Europe is the 
change in welfare state regimes themselves. Contemporary social scientists 
have eloquently argued that institutional lock-in has in large part determined the 
outcomes of reform efforts of the past two decades. Since cutting welfare state 
benefits is not likely to be overly popular and pluralist democracies offer ample 
opportunity to punish unpopular politicians, so the argument goes, policy-
makers have not had the stomach for incisive reforms. Instead, reforms have 
been incremental, piecemeal and iterative. More importantly, on the whole 
reforms have moved well within the institutional logic of existing provision.  
However, even New Institutionalist thinkers concede (c.f. Pierson, 2001) that 
reforms have actually changed welfare states in important ways. Other social 
scientists (Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993) argue that, over the course of two 
decades, many incremental policy adjustments have amounted to a wholesale 
shift in the orientation of social policy. While New Institutionalists are right in 
pointing out that actual benefits and provisions have changed within the ‘normal’ 
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parameters of each individual welfare state regime, the subpolitics of welfare 
state policy-making has transformed considerably.  
Public pension systems are at the heart of the welfare state regimes (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). The way pension systems change, then, reflects the general 
direction of welfare state reform. Pension reform experiences of the past 
decade have affected the way policy-makers go about setting pension reform 
agendas and formulating pension policy. The changes, which took place at 
three interdependent levels, have widened the scope of political conflict in all 
countries. 
Pension policy communities in Europe have become more open and pluralist. 
Traditionally, a relatively limited set of designated pension experts populated 
pension policy communities. Moreover, these policy networks, based on the 
exchange of accredited pension data and political compliance, tended to closely 
reflect corporatist socio-economic cleavages. Throughout the 1990s, however, 
new actors have challenged established policy communities across Europe. 
Both the media as well as financial interests (such as the banking and 
insurance industries) have made successful inroads into established pension 
policy communities. What is more, new policy actors have mounted a 
successful scientific challenge to established pension knowledge: pension 
knowledge orthodoxy has turned into pension knowledge heterodoxy. As a 
result, the interaction between policy actors has deveiated from the 
consociational blueprint outlined in Section 2 to become increasingly 
problematic and conflictual.  
Policy conflict about pension reform falls into three distinct categories. 
- First, European countries feature a group of policy actors (whose 
institutional ‘location’ differs from country to country) that stress 
intergenerational equity: pension reform has to ensure that financial 
burdens of demographic ageing do not cripple the younger generation of 
workers and, by extension, the economy. These policy actors suggest that 
the retired should increasingly rely on private sector mechanisms. 
- Second, all countries feature policy actors that argue in favour of preserving 
social stability: here, pension reform needs to strengthen, not weaken, 
existing institutional pension arrangements that guarantee of social stability 
and social peace. These policy actors form what New Institutionalists refer 
to as the “pro-welfare coalition” (Bonoli, 2000). 
- Last, certain policy actors in many (if not all) European countries argue for a 
more equal and just pension system: according to these policy actors, 
pension systems should level the differences between citizens (rich and 
poor, men and women, foreigners and natives, etc.). In a very real sense, 
the Senior Citizenship discourse embraces this policy story about pensions.  
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These three “pension policy stories” have provided the ideological basis for 
policy conflict in Europe. The level of conflict, however, varies across different 
countries. In Austria, Germany, France and Italy, policy conflict is most heated: 
here, pension debates have become “intractable policy controversies” in which 
all parties to the debate are firmly entrenched in their respective position. Here, 
pension reform has proven particularly difficult and politically risky. In countries 
such as Norway and Poland, in turn, policy conflict is at a more intermediate 
level: here, controversial reforms have taken place at relatively little political 
cost.  
Further, the last decade has witnessed an ideological realignment of political 
elites in most European countries. Increasingly, political parties no longer neatly 
reflect corporatist cleavages. Rather, political parties themselves have become 
locations of principled policy conflict about social policy. Throughout the 1990s, 
major parties have shifted towards the centre of the political spectrum. This has 
left many policy actors, most notably the unions, without strong institutional 
backing at the political level. 
The changes in pension policy communities and the emergence of policy 
conflict have generally empowered governments relative to policy actors. The 
reforms have brought about two somewhat contradictory effects. On the one 
hand, the diversification of actors and ideologies has increased strategic options 
for governments: whereas policy-making was inexorably tied to corporatist 
decision-making structures before the 1990s, the past decade has opened new 
channels of policy communication and new potential alliances (such as 
alliances between social democratic parties and financial interests). On the 
other hand, the introduction of conflict and scientific uncertainty has made 
policy-making a far more precarious undertaking: whereas corporatist structures 
ensured compliance and co-operation from policy actors, new policy-making 
realities render policy outcomes far less predictable. Consequently, policy 
failure has become more likely and the price of failure has in many cases meant 
the demise of governments.  
In general, the changes in pension policy-making have given rise to a paradox. 
Although pension policy communities have become more open and pluralist, 
this has not necessarily implied an increase in democratic accountability. In 
most countries (except Norway), the policy process circumvents parliament and 
changes have, generally, released the executive from corporatist controls. 
Furthermore, increased policy conflict has left pension reform policy processes 
less linear, more complex, and increasingly messy. 
3.4 Implications for Active Ageing Policy-Making 
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These institutional processes provide a more optimistic outlook for European 
active ageing policy-making. Path departure at the level of national welfare 
states means the scene of active ageing policy-making is increasingly shifting 
away from systems of serial political processing to the more murky waters of 
parallel subpolitical policy-making (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). As policy 
networks with a fundamentally different approaches to policy-making become 
implicated in ageing policy formulation and implementation, we may witness a 
reorientation of problem definition and agenda-setting. Rather than emphasising 
institutional incommensurability in order uphold the privileged access to policy-
making, policy actors may actively seek transnational cooperation to solve 
practical problems of service-provision. Within this institutional stream, active 
ageing policy becomes a common search for solutions to problems of ageing 
that persist across boundaries, whether they are policy domains or national 
welfare states.  
Within this institutional trajectory, there clearly is a role for the EU in the 
formulation, coordination and implementation of active ageing policy. This role 
stretches beyond setting broad policy goals to potentially include a wide range 
of regulatory issues (e.g. setting standards for care and social services, 
regulating the political participation of older people, minimal environmental and 
work-place standards, etc.) and coordinating functions (e.g. networking and 
connecting different policy networks across Europe via policy programmes). 
However, it seems most practical and feasible to start the networking processes 
with policy subsystems that differ the least. Since path departure takes place at 
the meso-level of policy-making (Rhodes, 1990), the coordination efforts are 
best concentrated on the subpolitics of ageing policy-making in Europe. This 
means that policy coordination at national level is less likely to be successful.  
The EU should build on existing and potential synergies the between similar 
policy subsystems across national borders (i.e. long-term care, NGO sectors, 
etc.). In the context of institutional path departure, policy tools such as the open 
method of coordination (OMC) may have an ambivalent effect on active ageing 
agendas. On the one hand, the OMC sharpens national social policy-makers’ 
awareness of common policy issues. In this sense, the OMC may itself 
contribute to path-departure. On the other hand, by inviting national social 
policy-makers to draft National Action Plans, the OMC reorients the policy focus 
to the national level. This, in turn, may strengthen path dependent institutional 
developments. If European policy actors want to exploit the centripetal forces of 
institutional path departure13, then the EU institutions will have to rely on policy 
instruments that  connect, strengthen and promote the activities in the 
alternative institutional landscapes. This implies creating a legal framework at 
                                                     
13 There is some indication that this is the case. Alan Walker (2003) has drafted ana 
active ageing policy programme for the European Commission along the lines of the 
Senior Citizenship discourse.  
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European level (e.g. the anti-discrimination directives) as well as a flexible 
institutional structures that provide shortcuts between the local policy contexts 
and European policy-making. 
 
4 Conclusions: Barriers and Opportunities for Active Ageing 
Policies In Europe 
The first phase of the ActivAge project investigated the institutional contexts in 
which active ageing in Europe takes place. Our research discovered that active 
ageing has become a policy issue across Europe, albeit not a very important 
one. In all countries except Finland, active ageing is a political backwater. This 
is not to say that policy-makers and politicians completely unaware about active 
ageing. In all European countries, policy actors are claiming to be committed to 
implementing an active ageing policy agenda. However, the commitment to 
active ageing, it would seem, is of the same quality as European policy-makers’ 
commitment to sustainable development or S&T policy: arguable. Nonetheless, 
polities in many European countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, Czech Republic) 
have devoted some administrative capacity to ageing policy-making.  
The issue that runs like a thread through the findings of the ActivAge project is 
institutional fragmentation. In all countries of the ActivAge sample, 
responsibilities for active ageing policy-making are scattered across policy 
domains as divergent as adult education, local social service provision and 
labour market administration. With the exception of Finland, whose structured 
national programmes on ageing are exemplary (even for Nordic countries), 
none of the countries coordinate these divergent strands of policy-making. As a 
result, the active ageing policy agendas, in the countries that own such 
programmes, tend to be a rather eclectic mix of policy measures and initiatives.  
As we have seen, institutional fragmentation is the reason why two sets of 
countervailing institutional processes impinge upon active ageing agendas. One 
set of processes emphasises institutional continuity. Here, the institutions of the 
welfare state appropriate the idea of active ageing and mould it within their own 
institutional cosmos. This means that European active ageing policy invariably 
branches and bifurcates within the different national welfare state policy 
communities. This development would imply that active ageing policies are best 
located at the national level of welfare state regimes.  
However, another set of institutional forces drives active ageing policy agendas 
in Europe in another direction. These institutional dynamics emerge from three 
sources. First, the fact that demographic ageing will affect a number of different 
policy domains means that the institutional landscapes are considerably more 
variegated than welfare state regimes may suggest. In particular, service-
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oriented and marginal social policy networks operate according to a different set 
of organisational rules. This quite simply provides conceptual and organisational 
alternatives to conventional welfare state policy-making. What is more, policy-
makers in these networks seem less daunted by national boundaries. Second, a 
coherent and well-argued policy discourse centred on the idea of ‘senior 
citizenship’ has become a fresh conceptual resource for agenda-setting and 
policy formulation. Not only does the concept provide a plausible story about 
demographic ageing, it also makes a strong public interest case for a 
comprehensive programmes of socio-cultural renewal. Last, but certainly not 
least, welfare state regimes themselves are changing. While social protection 
systems themselves have not changed radically, the way policy-makers go 
about setting reform agendas and formulating policy has. In most countries in 
the ActivAge sample (with the exception of Norway, the post-war social policy 
consensus is in a poor state or has collapsed. New policy actors have brought 
new ideas and practices to welfare state policy-making.  
Torn between two institutional trajectories, how will active ageing policy 
agendas in Europe develop? What barriers and opportunities emerge from 
fragmented institutional landscapes subject to contrasting institutional 
developments? 
Despite different institutional legacies, the ActivAge research uncovered a set of 
institutional barriers common to all countries in the sample: 
Structural Barriers  
The vertical and horizontal fragmentation of institutitional capacity in the public, 
private and tertiary sectors significantly hampers the development and 
implementation of active ageing agendas. Fragmented responsibilities have led 
to disjointed and poorly coordinated policy programmes. Moreover, when 
disparities across levels of governance (most prominently in France and 
Germany) join thematic tensions across policy domains, the interaction between 
different policy-makers becomes, at best, tenuous.  
In addition to institutional fragmentation, the political mobilisation of older people 
is poorly developed in Europe. Existing senior citizen organisations have not 
managed to provide older Europeans with an effective political voice. 
Experimental political parties designed to represent the interests of older people 
(e.g. in Poland, the Czech Republic, or Germany) have rarely survived a 
election.  
Last, in times of ‘permanent austerity’, policy-makers seem to view active 
ageing measures as somewhat of a luxury. Policy agendas and funding are 
likely to wax and wane with economic growth. For active ageing policy-makers 
in old Member States, this means that some years are lean and other years are 
leaner. In countries such as Poland or the Czech Republic or even southern 
THE ACTIVAGE  PROJECT –- SYNTHESIS REPORT 33
 
Italy, it implies that active ageing policy disappears with every economic 
downturn. 
Socio-Cultural Barriers 
Ageism and age discrimination, the ActivAge findings suggest, are a major 
barrier to the development of active ageing policies. The main problem here is 
the way misperceptions concerning the capabilities of older people pervade 
society. All social arenas, be it the state, the markets, technology, the arts or the 
mass media, seem to be obsessed by youth and repelled old age. Ageism and 
age discrimination are so wide-spread that even older people themselves lack 
confidence in their abilities. These exclusionary norms and practices, policy 
actors argue, are exacerbated by a lack of awareness among key policy-makers 
to do anything about discrimination. The message activists in the field in all 
countries are communicating is that policy action on ageing policies falls far 
short of policy rhetoric. In all countries, lack of awareness coupled with wide-
spread misperceptions about old age have resulted in an unwillingness by 
politicians to invest in active ageing policies. Policy-makers continue to define 
ageing issues in terms of narrow fiscal and economic aspects. Unless these 
(mis)perceptions change, active ageing is not likely to rise on the policy agenda. 
Conversely, the findings show a fewer commonalities in terms of opportunities 
for active ageing policies: 
Structural Opportunities 
In a very real sense, institutional structures in Europe are both barriers and 
opportunities for active ageing policies. In most countries of the ActivAge 
sample, existing institutional structures at all levels of governance hold 
considerable potential for successful active ageing policy-making. Across 
Europe, there is a  ‘critical mass’ of institutional capacity (Vidovicova et al., 
2003). Although the sectoral emphasis shifts from country to country (e.g. UK 
policy communities feature far more institutional capacity in the civil society 
than, say, Poland or the Czech Republic), governance capability per se is not a 
policy issue in Europe. Rather, policy actors across Europe agree, active ageing 
policies require the activation and coordination of institutional potential in 
Europe. Policy–makers, so the argument goes, need not reinvent the 
institutional wheel; rather, active ageing policies need judicious and strategic 
use of existing institutional resources. The entry of new policy actors such as 
NGOs or the European Commission into the social policy domain, argue policy 
actors in several countries, may go some way to seize the institutional 
opportunities in Europe. New policy actors at different levels of governance (for 
example, the local and supranational arena) are increasingly developing into a 
source of policy innovation compared to relatively rigid policy dynamics at the 
level of welfare state regimes.  
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Socio-Cultural Opportunities 
Although awareness of ageing is relatively low among policy-makers, the media 
and the general public alike, the level of knowledge about old age and ageing is 
on the increase. Most significantly, older people themselves are becoming more 
conscious of their own abilities. What is more, the old of the future are 
increasingly aware of the issues and challenges surrounding ageing and 
retirement. Firms across Europe, led by the Finnish example, are slowly 
beginning to realise and tap into the rich reservoir of skills and experience older 
workers represent.  
Although active ageing currently is not a burning hot policy priority, it 
nonetheless has become a staple in the policy diet of many European countries. 
This means the underlying concepts of active ageing policy-making are ‘floating’ 
around policy domains and are available for use. Moreover, these ideas and 
concepts are becoming an ‘unofficial’ yardstick or quality standard for policy 
responses to demographic ageing: in time, what Jon Elster (1998) calls the 
“normative force of hypocrisy” could begin to shape European social policy. 
Here, the fact that policy-makers publicly use the rhetoric of active ageing will 
create claims and commitments that, however cynical and self-serving the 
intention, will further active ageing policy agendas. 
Last, civil society activities at all levels of policy-making are opening new 
avenues for policy-making and, more importantly, policy implementation. New 
forms of political participation and civic involvement of older people are 
emerging in all countries in the ActivAge sample. Further, organisations in civil 
society are developing and pioneering innovative practical solutions to thorny 
problems of service provision and delivery. Again, these structures offer 
considerable potential.  
Whether European policy-makers will overcome the barriers and seize the 
opportunities for active ageing reform programmes will depend in largely, albeit 
not wholly, on whether institutional structures and practices enable them to. 
This, in turn, depends on whether and how policy actors strike a workable 
balance between the two countervailing institutional tendencies outlined in this 
paper. The tension between these processes is an unambiguously good thing 
for social policy-making in Europe. However, there is a real danger that the 
active ageing policy agenda will be burnt by the friction between these 
institutional processes. The challenge for policy-makers at all levels, but 
particularly at European level, will be to design policy processes that 
constructively use the tension between the two institutional logics to create 
institutional innovations that benefit Europeans of all ages. 
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